The Appeal of Reductionism

In first mentioning Marx’s theory of “base” and “superstructure” Raymond Williams highlights a common criticism of Marx in describing it as a “practice of reductionism—the specific human experiences and acts of creation converted so quickly and mechanically into classifications which always found their ultimate reality and significance elsewhere” (19). Williams proceeds later in the chapter to remedy the strict definition of “base” which he describes it as more than just a static state; as something that encompasses the many relationships that occur in a socio-economic setting. This reclassification of a basic idea of Marxist theory does serve as a remedy for a mistake in reductionism, yet it also highlights an obvious question. Why does a school of theory which at times can barely be applicable to real world social constructs have such a hold on studies concerning class? After all, many academics have built careers and written volumes attempting to make Marxist theory applicable to their specific notions of class.

Perhaps, it is in the reductionism highlighted by Williams where the strength and endurance of Marxist theory lies. In dismantling the complex nature of class and economic relationships to their more basic forms Marx opened up his theory to various other applications and disciplines, making it applicable to seemingly arbitrary topics. The criticism of Marx as simplistic thus works counterintuitively. As we have seen in Williams, and will most-likely see in our other readings, one cannot help but acknowledge the shortcomings of Marxist theory, even at times condemning the theorist. Yet, following our criticism closely is reevaluation and modification using that which we disapprove of as well needed foundation. Thus, Marx continues to endure through censure.